This logic, then the local government bond issue by a common selection problem evolved into a market choice , evolved by the government credit market credit , evolved by the government oversight of public oversight , this paradigm shift is clearly having a constitutional democracy value significance. In this logic, local government bonds depends on a handful of credit rating agencies is not , nor is it depends on the will of the local government , and became a public evaluation of local gov ernance best a bad ruler . If allowed to issue bonds at the same time , while the establishment of local public trading market for government bonds , local bonds to build a media evaluation indices , credit ratings from the public , the repayment ratio , transactions and other securities in the three major weekly newspaper , CCTV, People's Daily engage a ranking, and invited experts on the credibility of government bonds around the weekly review , so will the risk of local bonds and credibility at any place under the eyes of the public , the risk is completely controllable and transparent.
Of particular note in particular , in the design of specific risk mechanisms , must not engage in approval , quotas, and pilot projects to leave space for rent-seeking mechanism bad . It should be said , through the approval of risk prevention mechanism in China 's credit has been completely bankrupt , Guo Jingyi Woan as a classic case , with the approval procedures for foreign investment in the relevant department heads have been sacked conclusive illustrates this point . Once there is approval, once the existence of quotas , once the existence of the pilot , sub Lee Group will undermine the effective supervision of the local government will spare no effort to pass running Qian Jin to achieve its purpose . Thus, the entire mechanism of issuing bonds will be completely destroyed , triggering a series of moral hazard and crises. Most people believe that the central government is more disloyal than the local government , in fact , historical statistics show that , in many cases , the central government is more like a mafia . Therefore , I suggest that the central government departments , not in the approval on the issue of local bonds , as long as the control is good interest rates , as the number of bonds , bond issuance purposes , completely handed over to local people's congresses to consider , and will consider the results to be publicized , and then delegate issuers can be issued . Only real oversight powers to the public , and this oversight is valid, the local government bond issuance will not cause the debt crisis , to support local bonds will become the hand rather than the seeds of destruction .